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Abstract:  
We determine whether there is an endogenous Hidden Markov Regime (HMR) in 
the operational loss data of banks from 2001 to 2010. A high level regime is 
marked by very high loss values during the recent financial crisis. There is 
therefore temporal heterogeneity in the data. If this heterogeneity is not 
considered in risk management models, capital estimations will be biased. Levels 
of reserve capital will be overestimated in periods of normal losses, 
corresponding to the low level of the regime, and underestimated in periods of a 
high regime. Variation in capital can go up to 30% during this period of analysis 
when regimes are not considered. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the inception of operational risk modeling, authors have regularly highlighted the fact 
that the amount of reserve capital calculated is very fragile, even unstable. Ames, Schuermann 
and Scott (2014) clearly show this fragility with operational loss data related to the recent 
financial crisis that began in 2007. 
 
Before that, Neslehová, Embrechts and Chavez-Demoulin (2006) had affirmed the risk of 
working with “extreme value” distributions when preliminary estimates tend to exhibit an 
infinite mean or variance for the data (see also Dahen et al, 2010). These studies argue for more 
conventional base models to better estimate the distributions and consider the presence of 
switching regimes in the data endogenously. In this paper, we build on the scaling model of 
Dahen and Dionne (2010) by detecting and incorporating endogenous Hidden Markov regimes 
for losses of one million dollars and more. 
 
We show that the operational loss data of American banks are indeed characterized by a 
Hidden Markov switching model. The distribution of monthly losses is asymmetric, with a 
normal component in the low regime and a Skew t type 4 component in the high regime. 
Statistical tests do not allow us to reject this asymmetry. We then introduce the regimes 
obtained in the estimation of operational losses and verify that their presence significantly 
affects the distribution of losses in general. These results are particularly important for some 
operational losses, particularly those linked to financial product pricing errors, over which 
several large banks have been sued during and after the recent financial crisis. We also analyse 
the scaling of the data to banks of different sizes and risk exposures, and present the results of 
backtesting of the model in different banks. 
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The general message of our contribution is that there is temporal heterogeneity in the data. If 
this heterogeneity is not considered in the risk management models, capital estimations will be 
biased. Levels of reserve capital will be overestimated in periods of normal losses 
corresponding to the low level of the regime, and underestimated in a high regime period. 
Overall banks used too much capital for operational risk when the regimes are not considered 
in our period of analysis. 
 
In Section 2, we present the database used. Section 3 discusses identification models of regimes 
and presents their estimation. Section 4 measures the effect of regimes detected on the 
estimation of the distribution of operational losses, and Section 5 proposes a backtest of 
estimated parameters. A short conclusion ends the article. 
 
2 Data 
 
We use the Algo OpData Quantitative Database for operational losses of $1 million and more 
sustained by US banks. The study period is from January 2001 to December 2010. We examine 
the operational losses of US Bank Holding Companies (BHC) valued at over $1 billion. The 
source of information on these banks is the Federal Reserve of Chicago. Statistics on the sample 
built from the two databases are summarized in three Tables: 1, 2, and 4. 
 
Table 1 presents the size distribution of banks with $1 billion or more in assets that sustained 
operational losses of $1 million or more during the study period. We note a major increase in 
the mean size of banks during this period; maximum size has also grown significantly. Table 2 
shows that the largest banks accumulated the largest losses. Table 3 presents the Event Types 
and Business Lines codes subject to operational losses, as defined for the Basel regulation. 
Table 4 is a cross-loading table linking Event Types and Business Lines. We note that the largest 
mean losses are in Corporate Finance, Retail Brokerage and Trading and Sales for Business 
Lines, and in Clients, Products and Business Practice, Damage to Physical Assets, and Execution 
Delivery and Process Management for Event Types. 
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Table 1: Number of BHC banks per year and their assets 
Assets (in billions $) 
Year Median Mean Max Sd Number 
2001 2.1 19.7 944.3 82.3 356 
2002 2.1 19.5 1,097.2 84.8 378 
2003 2.0 20.3 1,264.0 93.0 408 
2004 2.0 25.4 1,484.1 122.1 421 
2005 2.0 24.4 1,547.8 121.9 445 
2006 2.1 26.0 1,884.3 140.5 461 
2007 2.1 28.9 2,358.3 168.1 460 
2008 2.0 28.5 2,251.5 182.5 470 
2009 2.1 33.8 2,323.4 190.6 472 
2010 2.1 34.7 2,370.6 198.3 458 
Note: Sd is for standard deviation. 
Table 2: Operational losses of BHC banks with bank asset in deciles 
Asset deciles 
(in billions $) 
Loss (in millions $) 
Min Max Median Mean Sd Number 
2,022.7 to 2,370.6 1.0 8,045.3 26.3 265.9 1,129.5 51 
1,509.6 to 2,022.7 1.0 8,400.0 14.0 268.3 1,207.5 49 
1,228.3 to 1,509.6 1.0 2,580.0 7.5 94.5 357.8 53 
799.3 to 1,228.3 1.0 3,782.3 24.0 199.8 610.7 48 
521.9 to 799.3 1.0 8,400.0 7.4 218.9 1,156.4 53 
1,247.1 to 521.9 1.1 210.2 7.2 17.0         31.1 50 
98.1 to 247.1 1.0 663.0 6.0 45.3 115.4 51 
33.7 to 98.1 1.0 775.0 10.2 55.2 152.8 51 
8.31 to 33.7 1.1 691.2 8.6 32.2         98.6 51 
0.96 to 8.31 1.0         65.0 4.3 9.9         14.5 51 
All 1.0 8,400.0 8.6 120.1 680.7 508 
Note: Sd is for standard deviation. 
 
Table 3: Nomenclature of Event Types and Business Lines codes 
Variables Codes 
Event Types  
  Clients products and business practice CliPBP 
  Business disruption and system failure BusDSF 
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  Damage to physical asset DamPA 
  Employment practices and workplace safety EmpWS 
  External fraud EF 
  Internal fraud IF 
  Execution delivery and process management ExeDPM 
  
Business Lines  
  Retail brokerage RBr 
  Payment and settlement PayS 
  Trading and sales TraS 
  Commercial banking ComB 
  Retail banking RBn 
  Agency services AgnS 
  Corporate finance CorF 
  Asset management AssM 
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Table 4: Cross-loading table of types of losses and business lines 
Business 
lines 
 CliBP BusDSF DamPA EmpPWS EF IF ExeDPM All 
Rbr Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
28.6 
89.7 
1,030.3 
36 
 
 
0.0 
0 
 
 
0.0 
0 
18.7 
33.8 
149.7 
8 
78.8 
 
78.8 
1 
8.0 
8.3 
103.5 
13 
2.8 
1.9 
5.7 
2 
22.8 
71.1 
1,367.9 
60 
PayS Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
62.4 
85.7 
873.7 
14 
19.2 
24.2 
57.6 
3 
743.0 
 
743.0 
1 
 
 
0.0 
0 
23.9 
4.6 
47.8 
2 
18.7 
16.6 
56.1 
3 
11.1 
8.8 
44.6 
4 
67.5 
150.0 
1,822.7 
27 
TraS Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
91.6 
195.8 
3,756.1 
41 
 
 
0.0 
0 
55.0 
 
55.0 
1 
6.9 
8.5 
34.7 
5 
18.0 
 
18.0 
1 
130.7 
228.9 
1,437.5 
11 
139.1 
286.6 
1,113.0 
8 
95.7 
202.6 
6,414.4 
67 
ComB Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
45.4 
65.5 
1,045.3 
23 
 
 
0.0 
0 
1.0 
 
1.0 
1 
16.0 
18.1 
80.1 
5 
18.6 
28.5 
725.7 
39 
22.1 
26.8 
309.4 
14 
36.7 
29.0 
147.0 
4 
26.8 
42.2 
2,308.5 
86 
RBn Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
369.8 
1,531.0 
21,819.8 
59 
2.0 
 
2.0 
1 
1.0 
 
1.0 
1 
7.3 
9.9 
58.8 
8 
17.8 
49.9 
604.6 
34 
11.0 
20.9 
505.4 
46 
29.4 
30.9 
264.3 
9 
147.2 
946.8 
23,255.9 
158 
AgnS Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
85.2 
138.2 
681.7 
8 
 
 
0.0 
0 
 
 
0.0 
0 
 
 
0.0 
0 
5.5 
6.5 
16.5 
3 
3.6 
 
3.6 
1 
 
 
0.0 
0 
58.5 
117.2 
701.9 
12 
CorF Mean 
Sd 
556.5 
1,473.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56.2 
77.0 
9.6 
13.4 
441.4 
1,311.7 
7 
 
Sum 
Count 
21,148.3 
38 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
449.5 
8 
28.7 
3 
21,626.5 
49 
AssM Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
75.3 
153.3 
3,012.2 
40 
 
 
0.0 
0 
 
 
0.0 
0 
 
 
0.0 
0 
95.0 
128.7 
189.9 
2 
61.6 
94.1 
184.9 
3 
37.4 
50.0 
149.4 
4 
72.2 
141.8 
3,536.5 
49 
All Mean 
Sd 
Sum 
Count 
206.1 
941.9 
53,367.3 
259 
14.9 
21.5 
59.6 
4 
200.0 
362.9 
800.0 
4 
12.4 
21.0 
323.3 
26 
20.5 
42.3 
1,681.4 
82 
30.8 
88.0 
3,049.9 
99 
51.6 
143.2 
1,752.8 
34 
120.1 
680.7 
61,034.3 
508 
Note: Loss amounts are in millions of dollars. 
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3 Identification of regimes 
 
We assume that there are regimes in operational loss data. To support this assertion, we 
present Figures 1, 2, and 3. The hatched area in Figure 1 identifies the dot-com recession in 
2001 and the recent recession corresponding to the financial crisis that began in 2007. We also 
note that the number of operational losses increased significantly during the last financial crisis, 
which did not occur during the 2001 recession. We observe another spike in the number of 
losses in 2010, one year after the recession ended. The losses in 2010 may be explained by 
delays linked to lawsuits. Indeed, several banks were sued after the financial crisis for having 
marketed complex financial products that were poorly structured, with incorrect prices and 
dubious ratings. Figure 2 presents similar evolutions in loss volatility. Figure 3 shows that the 
trend for number of losses of one million dollars and more is a sawtooth, but there is no major 
increase during and after the financial crisis. The year 2003 exhibits the highest frequencies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in monthly mean operational losses 
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Figure 2: Changes in monthly variance of operational losses 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Changes in number of operational losses 
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3.1 Markov Switching Regimes  
3.1.1 Literature 
 
Several researchers have attempted to detect the presence of unobservable regimes by using a 
Markov process (Hamilton, 1989; Rabiner, 1989). Since then, increasingly rich developments of 
the model have emerged in all fields of research. Siu (2007) shows the advantage of applying 
this methodology in finance and actuarial science to better price insurance products. 
Korolkiewicz and Elliott (2007) propose a credit rating model based on the concept of Markov 
Switching. Siu and Yang (2007) model the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) advantageously for 
market and credit risk models using a complete procedure. Liechty (2013) presents another 
example of Markov Switching as a risk management tool. The origins of HMM (Hidden Markov 
Modeling) date back to the 1960s, with Baum and Petrie (1966) and Baum et al. (1970). 
Hamilton (1989) made a dual contribution: he paved the way for the use of HMM in economics 
and finance, and developed his own estimation method called the Hamilton Filter. This method 
is very useful in cases where different levels of the regime are modeled with normal 
distributions.  
 
The Hamilton Filter implicitly supposes that observations come from distributions with a 
sufficient number of draws to notably consider that the initial conditions describing the system 
at starting time t = 1 has only a small effect on its evolution. This hypothesis has been studied in 
depth by Psaradakis and Sola (1998), who show that one would need a sample of at least 400 
observations to guarantee that the estimate works well, especially in the presence of known 
fat-tailed data. For this reason, we use the Baum-Welch algorithm, which we describe below, to 
estimate our model. As Mitra and Date (2010) and Bulla (2011) showed, this algorithm does not 
use a priori assumptions of distributions. 
 
3.1.2 Markov Switching Model 
 
11 
 
The basic idea behind this model is intuitive. We suppose that the data under study represent a 
system that possesses n possible distinct states. At any given moment, the system may be in 
either state. For a given state, the system can move to another state or remain in place. There 
are two probabilities that describe each state. Given that states are not observable, the model 
is called a Hidden Markov Model, or HMM. For our data, the objective is to identify and 
characterize “high loss” periods (state 2, for example) and separate them from “normal loss” 
periods endogenously (state 1). We inject information of loss severity and frequency that 
comes uniquely from the data, such that the model will show the unobservable underlying 
dynamics. We also analyse a three-state application in the robustness section of the paper. 
 
3.1.3 Estimation of the HMM with the Baum-Welch method 
 
To develop the estimation, we follow Zucchini and MacDonald (2009), Mitra and Date (2010), 
and Visser and Speekenbrink (2010). We now define the necessary notations. The variables are 
indexed by time   1,2,..., 1,t T T . Observations are noted as tx . The sequence of 
observations from   to t a b  is noted as    : 1 1, ,..., , , 1 to a b a a b bx x x x x a b T . The variable ts  
represents the state where the system is situated at time  , 1,...,tt s n . We suppose that n 
states exist. Similarly,  : 1 1, ,..., ,a b a a b bs s s s s  is the sequence of states of the system in the time 
interval a to b. The estimation will give a vector of the parameters  . The model is supposed to 
depend on the covariables noted as tz . According to Proposition 2 of Mitra and Date (2010), a 
HMM is well defined when the parameters  , ,A B   are known, A being the transition matrix 
n n  whose elements are written as  1ij t t ta Pr s j s i ,z ,   , B is a diagonal matrix whose 
elements    i t t t tb x Pr x s ,z ,  are written according to the densities that describe tx  when 
the system is in the state i = 1 to n, and π is a row vector  1 n  of the probabilities related to 
each state at  
1t  ,  1i tPr s i z ,   ,  1 i n,..., ,...,    . To simplify the presentation, we examine the 
case of two states  2n  , 1f  being the density function of a normal law for the low loss regime 
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(state 1), 2f  being the density function of the Skew t-distribution type 4 representing the high 
loss regime (state 2). The choice of this mixture of distributions will be justified at the end of 
this section. For now, note that 
 
 
1
2
0
0
t
t
t
f x
B
f x
 
  
 
 such that: 
    
2
1
1 1 2 2
1 1
1
2 2
t
t
x
f x exp,

 
  
 
  
  
 (3.1) 
where 1 0   and 1  . 
 
The Skew t-distribution type 4, noted as ST4, is defined as in Rigby et al (2014):  
      
 
   
 
 
2 21 12 2
2 2
2 22 2 22 2
2 2 2
1 1t tt t
c x x
f x I I x, , , x
 
 
    
  
        
       
        
 (3.2) 
where 
   
11 2 1 2
2 20 2 1 2 2 1 2 2, , , ,c B , B ,       

      . 
B is the beta function        B a,b a b a b     where   is the gamma function. 
 
Concerning the matrix 
 
 
1212
2222
1
1t
aa
A
aa
 
  
 
, the elements ija  will be modeled according to the 
m  independent covariables  1 mt t tz z ,...,z . We posit that: 
  ij tij za logistic    (3.3) 
 
where  logistic  is the logistic function 
 
 
 0 01 ij , ij ,k ij ,mij ij ,
exp
,..., ...,, ,
exp
   
 
  
 is a constant 
and ij ,k  is the coefficient to estimate for the k
th covariable ktz  relative to the conditional 
probability ija . Regarding the initial distribution  , a priori, it may depend on 1 1tz z  . 
However, below we will estimate   as a vector of constants. We can separate the   
parameters into three independent parts. Accordingly, we rewrite  0 1 2, ,     where 0 1,   
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and 2  are, respectively, the parameters to estimate for the initial distribution  , the 
parameters related to matrix A and those concerning matrix B representing the conditional 
densities if . We now write the probability of jointly observing the sequence of observations 
1:Tx  and that of the states of the system 1:Ts . 
 
        1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2
T T
:T :T :t t t t t t t t tPr x ,s z , Pr s z , Pr s s ,z , Pr x s ,z ,          (3.4) 
        11 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
T T
:T :T :t t t t t t t t tlogPr x ,s z , logPr s z , logPr s s ,z , logPr x s ,z ,   

      (3.5) 
 
Given that equation 3.5 is formed of a sum of three independent quantities, the maximum 
probability can be estimated for each of the vectors of parameters 0 1,   and 2  separately. In 
addition, if we consider that the initial distribution is independent from 1z , we can estimate the 
n probabilities of the vector  1 n,...,    as constants   0 1 n,...,   . 
 
Note that the probability function to maximize depends on the sequence 1:Ts  which is not 
observable. Our objective is to extract it from the sequence 1:Tx . One technical solution is to 
use the EM (Expectation Maximization) concept, which is better known as the Baum-Welch 
algorithm in the HMM context. We start with a vector of initial arbitrary values  0 . EM is an 
iterative process. Each loop is made up of two steps, E and M. For each loop  k , step E is to 
calculate a function Q defined as the mathematical expectation of the log probability, if we 
know the sequence 1:Tx  and using the value of the parameters 
 k  such that: 
         1 1 1 1k kk :T :T :T :TQ E logPr x ,s z , x ,,         . (3.6) 
 
Then, in step M, we look for the value of the vector   that maximizes   kQ ,  . This gives us a 
new set of parameters to find, namely: 
     1k kargmaxQ .,

      (3.7) 
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 1k   will be compared with  k  to verify the convergence criteria. In the absence of 
convergence,  1k  will serve as an entry for the following loop 1k  , and so on. The Baum-
Welch algorithm has been shown to always converge (Rabiner, 1989). 
 
Because it is a mathematical expectation, the quantity Q corresponds to computing a weighted 
sum of all of the possible probabilities for each of the three members to the right of equation 
(3.5). This gives: 
      
   
   
1 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2
nk
j
T n n
t j k t t t t
T n
t j t t t t
Q logPr s j z ,j,
logPr s k s j ,z ,j ,k
logPr x s j ,z ,j
  
 
 

    
 
 
     
  
 
where functions t  and t  represent the weights to calculate the mathematical expectation. 
Using the notation   1 k:TM z ,  to simplify the expressions, these weights t  and t  are 
written as: 
    1 1t t t :TPr s k,s j x ,Mj ,k     (3.8) 
    1t t :T tPr x s i ,Mj    (3.9) 
 
To calculate the probabilities t  and t , let us define two probabilities t  and t  such that for 
all 1i   to n regimes): 
    1t :t tPr x ,s ii M    (3.10) 
    1t t :t tPr x ,s i ,Mi    (3.11) 
 
In the literature, t  is called a forward probability because of the relationship of recurrence 
     1i t ijt j ta f x .j i      Similarly, t  is called a backward probability because of the 
relationship: 
     1 1j t ijt j ta f xji        with   1T ii   . 
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The derivation of these relationships with vector notation is almost immediate, as in Zucchini 
and MacDonald (2009), by writing the probability function: 
   1 2 21 1T t t T T:TL Pr B A B ...A B ...A B 'x M   . (3.12) 
 
By cutting the cross-product of equation 3.12 at time t, we have 1 2 2t t tB A B ...A B   and 
1 1 1t t t T TA B ...A B '    (with 1
'
T '  ). Hence 1t t t tA B     and 1 1 1t t t tA B     , which is the 
equivalent, in matrix notation, of the preceding forward and backward recurrence 
relationships. Now that our vectors t  and t  have been calculated, we can calculate the 
weight t  given that        1 1 1t t k t t jk Tf x a 'j ,k j k         as derived here: 
 t j ,k   1 1t t :TPr s k,s j x ,M    
    1 1 1t t :T :TPr s k,s j ,x Pr xM M    (3.13) 
  1 1 2 1 1:t t t :T t t :T TPr x ,x ,x ,s k,s j ,x LM      (3.14) 
    1 1 2 1 1:t t t t :T t :t t TPr x ,s j Pr x ,x ,s k x ,s j ,M LM        (3.15) 
  1:t tPr x ,s j M   (3.16) 
  1 2 1 1t t :T t :t tPr x x ,s k,x ,s j ,M      (3.17) 
  2 1 1t :T t :t tPr x s k,x ,s j ,M     (3.18) 
  1 1t :t t TPr s k x ,s j ,M L    (3.19) 
      1 1 1t k t t jk Tf x a 'j k        (3.20) 
 
Equation (3.13) is obtained by simple application of Bayes’ theorem. In (3.14) the sequence 1:Tx  
is cut into three pieces: from 1 1 1:t t :tx ,x    and 2t :Tx   using  1T :TL Pr x M  defined in (3.12). 
Equation (3.15) and equations (3.16) to (3.19) also use the Bayes model. Equation 3.16 is the 
direct expression of  t j . Equation (3.17) is simplified to  1 1t tPr x s   because 1 1t tx s   is 
known independently from 2t :Tx   and from ts  (by the very construction of the HMM). In 
equation (3.18), the sequence 2 1t :T tx s   is independent from 1:tx  and from ts . Lastly, on line 
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(3.19), because 1t ts s  do not depend on 1:tx  , the expression is reduced to 
 1t tPr s k s j ,M    which is equal to jka  in (3.20). It now remains to be shown that 
  1T j T TL ' .j    Based on definition (3.10) applied to    1T :T Tt T , Pr x ,s ii M   , the 
sum of  T i  on all i possible states must give the probability  1:TPr x M , because the system 
is necessarily and exclusively in one or the other of the i states. The same reasoning permits us 
to find  t j  in function of t  noticing that  
   11 1t k t t:T :TPr s j Pr s k,s jx ,M x ,M    . 
Hence, 
    t t
k
j j ,k  .  (3.21) 
 
To summarize the construction of probabilities t  and t , we first calculate t  which in turn 
yields t . From this point, we can calculate the function 
  kQ ,   to find  k   which 
maximizes Q. This advances the EM process until convergence to obtain the vector   of the 
final application parameters of the HMM. For our estimation, we have used the functions 
available in the package depmixS4 (Visser and Speekenbrink, 2010) with the Skew t type 4 
function of the gamlss package (Rigby et al, 2014), in R language by r-project.org. 
 
Concretely, we construct the sequence 1:Tx  from monthly mean losses (in log). We already 
know that the means are far from following a normal distribution. We consequently use a 
mixture where the first “normal” state will be modeled by a normal distribution and the second 
state of the high regime (abbreviated as HR) will be represented by a Skew t-distribution type 4 
(ST4). We want to capture the asymmetry and thickness of the distribution tail during this state. 
We also use the number of losses per quarter. To do so, we create a variable called lc123 as a 
natural logarithm of the number of losses announced during the three previous months. The 
idea is to capture whether the number of losses announced affects the intensity of transitions 
of the regime from one level to the other. Because the transition matrix is not constant, our 
model can be called non homogeneous. In short, we use four distributions as follows: 
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



  (3.22) 
 
Lastly: 
     12 0 12 1 22 0 22 10 11 1 1 2 2, , , , 2n , , ,,  and =,..., , , , , ,              . 
 
3.1.4 Results and discussion 
The results of the estimation of the model are presented in Table 5. We begin with the 
parameters of the two distributions that we use. The Normal distribution, which models phases 
of low losses, has a mean of 2.4172 and a standard deviation of 0.7653. The two corresponding 
coefficients are very significant at all degrees of confidence chosen. Regarding the Skew-t type 
4, its mean is estimated at 3.7872, whereas its standard deviation can be considered equal to 1 
(its log can be considered statistically null because it is non-significant). In a high regime, we 
therefore have a significant and simultaneous increase in the mean and an increase in the 
standard deviation. In addition, the asymmetry of the Skew-t type 4 is confirmed by the 
log(Shape.nu) coefficient significant at 10%. We will return to the validation of these 
distributions below by performing a robustness analysis of our statistical results. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of the Hidden Markov Model 
Variable  Coefficient 
Probability of transition to High Regime 
 
Intercept 
lc123 
0.9772 
-1.7371*** 
Probability of staying in High Regime Intercept 
lc123 
-25.7285*** 
11.7434*** 
Estimation of Normal distribution mu 
sigma 
2.4172*** 
0.7653*** 
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Estimation of ST4 distribution mu 
log (sigma) 
log(shape.nu) 
log(shape.tau) 
3.7872*** 
-0.0415 
2.7734* 
0.9492 
Estimation of HMM model Log max likelihood 
AIC criteria 
Number of  
  observations 
-148.838 
319.677 
 
120 
       Note: *indicates significant at 10% and *** indicates significant at 1%. 
 
Figure 4: Markov transition probabilities 
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Figure 5: Markov Regimes detected from January 2001 to December 2010 
 
The estimation of Table 5 gives a value of   2 1670 7734exp ..    and 
  2 5840 9492exp . ,.    which measures a very large thickness of ST4 distribution tails. 
Nonetheless, given that the estimation of  log   in Table 5 is not significant,  log   can be 
considered null, therefore 1.   The right distribution tail would be thicker in this sense. Given 
these estimated two degrees of freedom markedly below 30, this is confirmation that we are 
far from a normal law where 30   and 30  .  
 
We now discuss the stages of the transition probability in Table 5. The coefficient of the 
variable lc123 is very significantly negative. This means that the larger the number of losses, the 
lower the probability of starting from a high regime, which would be a bit odd. To understand 
what is happening, we draw in Figure 4 the curves of the two transition functions: move to or 
stay in a high regime. Note that the number of losses is historically limited to between 7 and 20 
per quarter (where lc123 is included between 2 and 3). In this case, in Figure 4, the section to 
the left of the point lc123 = 2 would be meaningless, and was therefore cut from the figure. The 
part to the right of this point presents a barely declining curve, nearly parallel with the X axis, 
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with a value of about 5% as a probability of moving to a high regime (HR). We can reasonably 
assume that the number of loss announcements does not play a role in predicting movement to 
a HR, nor does the increase (or not) in operational losses. Consequently, by reformulating the 
foregoing in statistical terms, we have found evidence to support the hypothesis of 
independence of distributions of frequencies and severities, which is an important contribution 
of this research. To continue with the probability of remaining in a high regime, if the number 
of loss announcements is between 7 and 12 per quarter, the mean probability of staying is 
about 50%. At between 12 and 24 mean quarterly losses, the probability of remaining in a high 
regime state is practically 99%.  
 
Let us now consider Figure 5, which shows the Markov switching states detected. Three facts 
emerge from the figure. First, there was almost no reaction for the recession of 2001 (2001-03 
to 2001-11), and only a few fluctuations in probability transition around 2003-2005. In contrast, 
there is indeed a high regime detected during the recession starting in 2007 (2007-12 to 2009-
06), with a first impetus lasting one month in December 2007, followed by two other variations. 
The first lasts five months, from July to November 2008 inclusively, and the second lasts six 
months, from August 2009 until January 2010 inclusively. The latter happens after the end of 
the recession. 
 
It is interesting to document this fact by analyzing what happened for the two variations. To do 
so, we take the individual losses at the largest amounts, which represent at least 80% of the 
total lost during each period analyzed. We obtained information on what happened for these 
losses by gathering comments inserted in the loss database, which includes the Bloomberg and 
SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) sites. As reported in Table 6, there were two 
losses of $8.4 billion each for the first variation. This amount is an all-time record for 
operational losses of BHC banks. The first loss was incurred by Wachovia Bank in July 2008. It 
comprises a series of final writedowns linked to mortgages. The class action suit filed in federal 
court in California on June 6, 2008 alleges that the bank distorted its standards for underwriting 
option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), with payment structures that lacked the usual 
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guarantees that were nonetheless stipulated in the contracts. This is a CliPBP type loss. The 
second loss, for the same amount, i.e. $8.4 billion, concerns CFC of Bank of America. In October 
2008, it was accused of illegal practices concerning products related to bank loans; 400,000 
buyers were affected. CFC had to agree to settle the lawsuits filed against it by a group of 
attorneys general in 11 states, including California, Florida, Illinois, Connecticut, and 
Washington. The two losses represent over 81% of the $20.6 billion lost during this first 
variation from July to November 2008. Both cases pertain to problems related to subprime 
loans. In addition, both banks agreed to settle the class-action suits without waiting for a 
decision from the courts. There was thus no gap between the time the problems were observed 
and the date the losses were reported. We will see that this is not the case for most of the large 
losses in the period of the second variation, from August 2009 to January 2010. 
 
Table 7 shows six major losses for this period, which account for more than 80% of the total 
losses. We begin with Citigroup, which announced a loss of $840 million in January 2010. This 
loss results from an accounting error related to the way the bank calculated its CVA (Credit 
Value Adjustment). The bank claimed that this correction should reduce the earnings 
announced in the previous quarters, without specifying which. This implies that the decision is 
linked to credit problems that occurred during the 2008 crisis. The second loss concerns 
Discover Financial Services, which announced on February 12, 2010, that it would pay its former 
parent corporation Morgan Stanley $775 million to settle a breach of a contractual agreement. 
The case started in October 2008, when Morgan Stanley filed a complaint against Discover 
Financial Services concerning the distribution of proceeds from the resolution of antitrust 
litigation against rival issuers of Visa and MasterCard credit cards. 
 
The third loss is $722 million. On November 4, 2009, the SEC announced a settlement whereby 
JP Morgan Securities paid a fine of $25 million to the SEC, and $50 million to Jefferson County, 
and dropped its claim for $647 million in termination fees linked to bonds and interest rate 
swaps. This settlement follows the sentencing of a former civil servant for accepting bribes. 
Originally, Jefferson County was verging on bankruptcy in February 2008. The $3 billion 
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refinancing of its sewage system collapsed during the credit crisis. JPMorgan was the leader in 
banking transactions.  
 
Fourth, in February 2010, the SEC and the Massachusetts authorities announced that the State 
Street Bank and Trust agreed to pay damages and fines under a judgment following allegations 
that the bank had misled some bonds investors about "Limited Duration Bond Fund" in 2007. 
The SEC also accused the bank of having provided information on these funds internally, which 
would have let some investors redeem the bonds early to the detriment of others who did not 
have this information. According to the SEC, the State Street Bank and Trust began to market 
the Limited Duration Bond Fund, which it described as "enhanced cash," in 2002. Many 
investors saw it as an interesting alternative to the money market. The problem was that in 
2007, these funds were almost entirely invested in subprime residential securities and 
derivatives, which is much riskier than what the bank suggested in its communications. 
 
For the fifth loss, according to the SEC, Bank of America omitted to accurately report to 
shareholders the losses on Merrill Lynch’s books before the final ratification vote of the 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch. Bank of America was ordered to pay $150 million. The sixth and 
final loss occurred in September 2009: a businessman pled guilty and was sentenced to 12 
years in prison for defrauding Bank of America ($142 million), Citigroup ($75 million) and HSBC 
($75 million), a case of external fraud totaling more than $292 million. Apart from this case, the 
losses cited are linked to problems with information disclosure or errors related to risk 
management of financial products, particularly pricing, during the financial crisis. All of these 
losses were subject to varying delays due to lawsuits. Consequently, the second peak 
fundamentally consists of a series of problems that arose during the financial crisis. The gap in 
time between the two variations seems to stem uniquely from legal procedures. 
 
Further, credit risk always exists, and is highly influenced by Shadow Banking. Largely 
comprising false declarations and improper transactions, Shadow Banking is quite prominent in 
credit portfolios. Over $500 billion in credit “left” the banks’ balance sheets and somehow 
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transformed into Asset-Backed Commercial Papers between 2004 and 2007. This new way of 
skirting capital regulation, which bankers found too costly, reached a total of $1.3 trillion in July 
2007 (Kroszner and Strahan, 2013; Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013). Kindelberger and Aliber 
(2005) argue that "... as the monetary system gets stretched, institutions lose liquidity and 
unsuccessful swindles are about to be revealed, the temptation to take the money and run 
becomes virtually irresistible." 
 
We now examine more losses from the 2008 crisis. Citigroup paid a total of $8.045 billion in 
March 2008 for the Enron scandal. Earlier, in October 2007, CFC lost $1.2 billion following the 
first waves of default in the subprime market. Bank of America intervened and ultimately 
bought out CFC. To continue this historical review, Goldman Sachs sustained a loss of $768 
million in August 2008 concerning ARS (Auction Rate Securities). This bank was obliged to buy 
back 1.5 billion of these market instruments and paid penalties on this transaction. In another 
case of CliPBP, Bank of America had the same experience on a larger scale, and bought back 4.5 
billion in ARS, for a total loss of $720.7 million in January 2009. OpVar categorizes the latter two 
losses as Trading and Sales business, which represents most CliPBP cases with Corporate 
Finance business. 
 
In conclusion, in 90% of cases of operational losses, credit is pivotal to a history of improper 
transactions, along with Corporate Finance, Trading and Sales and/or Retail Banking. 80% of the 
amounts in question are attributable to two (Table 6) to six (Table 7) cases. In addition, it is 
often the same banks that are involved. Note that these historical spotlights were done by 
following “special” periods underscored by the regime shift detected. In other words, the 
regime detected seems to concern a set of banks in particular. We have documented 80% of 
the severity of operational losses by about only 20 cases, involving less than eight banks. 
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Table 6: Summary of losses of BHC banks from July 2008 to November 2008  
 Bank Loss EventType BusLine Date % Loss 
1 Wachovia Bank 8.4 billion CliPBP RBn 2008-07-21 40.73 
2 CFC – Bank of America 8.4 billion CliPBP RBn 2008-10-06 40.73 
 Others (< 80%) 3.4 billion 30 losses    
 All 20.6 billion 32 losses    
 
 
Table 7: Summary of losses of main BHC banks from August 2009 to February 2010 
 Bank Loss EventType BusLine Date % Loss 
1 Citibank N.A. 840 million ExeDPM TraS 2010-01-19 20.77 
2 Discover Financial Service 775 million CliPBP RBn 2010-02-12 19.16 
3 JP Morgan Securities Inc. 722 million CliPBP CorF 2009-11-04 17.85 
4 State Street Global Advis 663 million CliPBP AssM 2010-02-04 16.39 
5 Merrill Lynch and Company 150 million CliPBP CorF 2010-02-22 3.71 
6 Bank of America Corporation 142 million EF ComB 2009-09-21 3.51 
       
 Others (< 80%) 753 million 21 losses    
 All 4.05 billion 27 losses    
 
 
3.1.5 Specification Test of the Hidden Markov Model 
 
We now statistically test the validity of the HMM specification for our data. To do so, we follow 
Zucchini and MacDonald (2009). In general, if a random variable y follows a law   whose 
cumulative function is F, the random variable defined by  u F y  must follow a uniform law 
 0 1U , . By noting as   the cumulative function of the normal law, we should then have: 
        10 1 0 1y u F U NFy y, ,   . 
The variable obtained by   1z F y  is called a pseudo-residual. If the specification   suits 
the data, the pseudo-residuals should follow a normal distribution. 
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In our case, the vector of the pseudo-residuals of our Hidden Markov Model can be calculated 
with    1 1 1 0 1t t t t tz Pr y y y y z N .,

 
       For details, we refer to Zucchini and 
MacDonald (2009). 
 
Figure 6 shows the following points. The distribution of the monthly losses (in log) is 
asymmetrical (upper panel). The Skew t type 4 component is situated to the right of the mean 
to take this asymmetry into account (middle panel). The distribution of pseudo-residuals looks 
quite close to normal (bottom panel). This will be confirmed by the statistical tests. We now 
consider the statistical results in Table 8. We use three tests—Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-
Darling and Shapiro-Wilk—, to ensure the normal distribution of the pseudo-residuals. For 
comparison purposes, Table 8 shows the result of the same tests done on the series of monthly 
mean losses (monthly losses, in log). Because of high asymmetry, the three tests reject 
normality at 10% for this series of losses, as expected.  
 
As for our model (pseudo-residuals), the Anderson-Darling test gives a p-value of 0.0682. This 
rejects normality even if this p-value is not far from 10%. Conversely, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and Shapiro-Wilk tests do not allow us to reject the normality of these pseudo-residuals with p-
values of 0.1540 and 0.1560 respectively. This seems to show that despite a problem of a fat-
tailed distribution demonstrated by the Anderson-Darling test, we can validate our Hidden 
Markov specification given the two other tests and especially the Shapiro-Wilk test, which 
measures the global probability relative to a normal distribution. 
 
Table 8: Statistical tests  
 Test Monthly losses Pseudo-residuals 
       Statistic      p-value      Statistic      p-value 
1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.1035 0.0039 0.0718 0.1540 
2 Anderson-Darling 0.3101 0.0020 0.6940 0.0682 
3 Shapiro-Wilk 0.9331 0.0000 0.9831 0.1560 
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Figure 6: Histograms of monthly losses and pseudo-residuals 
 
4 Measuring the effect of regimes detected  
 
We start with the loss estimation model of Dahen and Dionne (2010): 
    log log BusinessLines EventTypesLoss Assets       . (4.1) 
 
The dependent variable is log(Loss). The independent variables are log(Assets), category 
variables Business Lines, BL, and category variables EventTypes, ET. The fixed time effects are 
years. 
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The regressions results are presented in Table 9. Model (1a) is the reference model. To simplify 
the presentation of the estimates, we do not report the coefficients of the year fixed effects 
(Year FE), because they are not pertinent to the discussion. A “yes/no” indication for their 
presence is presented in the table. We add the variable of the HMM regime only in model (2a) 
and its cross-loadings (interaction) with Business Lines and Event Types in (3a). 1 All standard 
deviations and p-values are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and clustering in the 
sense of White (1980). 
 
Table 9: Effect of regimes detected on log(Loss) 
 
(1a) 
Reference model 
(2a) 
Adding HMM 
regime 
(3a) 
Adding HMM 
regime and 
crossings 
Intercept -0.297 
(0.433) 
-0.260 
(0.446) 
-0.160 
(0.436) 
Log(Assets) 0.139*** 
(0.037) 
0.139*** 
(0.038) 
0.126*** 
(0.036) 
High Regime  0.977*** 
(0.331) 
1.538* 
(0.791) 
Paymt and Settlmnt 1.261*** 
(0.438) 
1.199*** 
(0.438) 
1.196** 
(0.466) 
Trading and Sales 1.104*** 
(0.290) 
1.026*** 
(0.304) 
0.906** 
(0.372) 
Comm. Banking 1.182*** 
(0.167) 
1.117*** 
(0.164) 
1.159*** 
(0.172) 
Retail Banking 0.930*** 
(0.207) 
0.867*** 
(0.207) 
0.827*** 
(0.171) 
Agency Services 1.223*** 
(0.413) 
1.161*** 
(0.435) 
1.532*** 
(0.443) 
Corp. Finance 2.056*** 
(0.237) 
2.063*** 
(0.250) 
1.999*** 
(0.294) 
Asset Mngmt 1.358*** 
(0.274) 
1.321*** 
(0.254) 
1.307*** 
(0.283) 
Bus.Disrup. syst.Fail. -1.080 
(0.687) 
-0.926 
(0.569) 
-0.878 
(0.630) 
                                                 
1
 The model has also been estimated using Heckman’s model to consider potential endogeneity of firms that 
sustained losses, as in Dahen and Dionne (2010). The results are available from the authors. They indicate that the 
inverse Mills ratio is not significant in the second step; the other results remain comparable to those in Table 9. 
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Damage Phy.Assets -0.086 
(1.925) 
-0.044 
(1.923) 
0.047 
(1.953) 
Employ.Prac.Wrkplac.Saf. -0.676*** 
(0.252) 
-0.622** 
(0.254) 
-0.476** 
(0.224) 
External Fraud -0.502*** 
(0.157) 
-0.489*** 
(0.161) 
-0.433** 
(0.170) 
Internal Fraud -0.593*** 
(0.227) 
-0.524** 
(0.226) 
-0.304 
(0.211) 
Exer. Deliv. Proc. Mnmt -0.214 
(0.228) 
-0.217 
(0.230) 
-0.130 
(0.256) 
High Regime   
Employ.Prac.Wrkplac.Saf. 
  -2.321*** 
(0.513) 
High Regime   External Fraud   0.120 
(1.088) 
High Regime   Internal Fraud   -3.314*** 
(0.547) 
High Regime   Exec. Deliv. Proc. Mnmt   0.115 
(1.228) 
High Regime   Paymt and Settlmnt   -0.561 
(1.584) 
High Regime   Trading and Sales   0.317 
(1.248) 
High Regime   Comm. Banking   -1.511 
(1.266) 
High Regime   Retail Banking   0.401 
(1.075) 
High Regime   Agency Services   -4.491*** 
(1.114) 
High Regime   Corp. Finance   0.645 
(1.565) 
High Regime   Asset Mngmt   -0.249 
(0.963) 
Year FE yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.170 0.186 0.223 
AIC 1993.5 1985.2 1978.04 
Log Likelihood 
p-value Chi2 
-971.8 -966.6 
0.001 (2a vs 1a) 
-952.0 
0.002 (3a vs 2a) 
Num. obs. 508 508 508 
 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Clients products and business practice and retail brokerage are 
the omitted categories for Event Types and Business Lines, respectively. 
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The variable log(Assets) is very significant, which is consistent with this type of model. The 
coefficient tends to keep the same magnitude in all regressions. The coefficient of the high 
regime variable is very significant at 1% in model 2a but less significant in model 3a, where it is 
significant at 10%. In contrast, three interaction variables are significant at 1%. The presence of 
year fixed effects does not prevent the regimes from being significant. This suggests that the 
regimes detected cannot be explained by time. Comparison of the adjusted R2 of the models 
shows an advantage in injecting the high regime variable in 2a or cross-loaded in 3a. The AIC 
statistic and the Log Likelihood ratio test also confirm the superiority of model 3a. That being 
said, we must perform backtesting on these models to evaluate their validity and calculate the 
reserve capital. Note that in the loss database there were no observations concerning BusDSF 
or DamPA where the Markov regime is high. This is why the coefficients corresponding to the 
cross-loadings are not presented in column 3a. 
 
We must measure the effect of the regime levels on the loss frequencies to perform the 
backtest. We build the model around the zero-inflated negative binomial as in Dahen and 
Dionne (2010). Let Y  be a random variable that follows a negative binomial law with average   
and the dispersion parameter  . If NBf  is the probability mass function of this law, then the 
probability that Y  is equal to a value k is written as: 
    
 
 
1
1 1
, , ,
! 1 1 1
NB
k
Pr Y k f k
k
 
   
  
     
           
 (4.2) 
where  0,1,2,...,k     designates the conventional gamma function. Note that 0   and that 
the negative binomial converges toward a Poisson law when 0   (Dionne, 1992). When 
there are reasons to think that there are too many 0 values relative to a negative binomial, we 
should envision a model with a negative zero inflated binomial law. Let Yij be a variable 
representing the number of losses sustained by bank i for the year j. If ijY  follows a zero-inflated 
negative binomial law, we can write: 
  
   
   
1 0, , 0
1 , , 1,2,...
ij ijij NB
ij
ij ijNB
qq f k
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  (4.3) 
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where ij  is the mean and   is the dispersion parameter of the basic negative binomial law, 
and ijq  represents the proportion of zeros that would be too many relative to a negative 
binomial law. Conditionally on the explanatory variables chosen, the regression component of 
the negative binomial model ij , and ijq  are estimated using the two following equations: 
 
   0 1 2 3
4 5_ _
ij ij
ij ij
Assetslog log RegimeHMM GDP
Bank Cap Mean Salary
    
 
   
 
 (4.4) 
  0 1 2 3 4 _ .1
ij
ij ij
ij
q
Assetslog log RegimeHMM GDP Mean Salary
q
    
 
     
 
 (4.5) 
 
The last formula is equivalent to the modeling of ijq  using the logistic distribution. The variable 
log(Assets) is the total assets of the bank (in log) and the variable HMM is for the High Regime. 
Mean-Salary is the mean salary paid in the bank, Bank_Cap is the bank capitalization and GDP is 
Gross Domestic Product during the period. 
 
The estimates are presented in Table 10. The dependent variable is the number of annual 
losses. In (1b) we present the benchmark model to compare the effect of adding regimes: 4,329 
observations from January 2001 to December 2010, as documented in Table 1. We want to 
measure the effect of the HMM (high) regime in both the counting and zero parts. The idea is 
that during high regimes, we want to see whether inflated zeros are more numerous or not. 
Model (2b) adds this dimension in both parts. Its coefficient is negative and significant at 10% in 
the count, and very significantly positive for zeros. Apparently, during high levels of the Markov 
regime, losses would be less numerous because the zeros come more from the inflation of the 
zeros (outside the negative binomial). The variable GDP is also very significant to explain excess 
zeros. We want to measure whether deflation of zeros provides statistical value. To do so, we 
compare this deflation model with the base model 1b. Knowing that they are embedded, we 
can test it with the likelihood ratio whose results appear below in the same table. The 
likelihood ratio test of model 2b versus 1b is conclusive, with a statistic of 46.53 and a p-value 
of almost 0. Model 2b using the Markov regime seems to provide more information than the 
reference model (1b) given the substantial decrease in the AIC criterion and the result of the 
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likelihood ratio test. A final comment concerns the values of the log theta dispersion parameter 
of the negative deflated binomial model. Starting with a value of 2.097 in model 1b, we reach 
1.085 for 2b, which is a clear improvement in the specification in the sense that there is less 
unobserved heterogeneity in 2b. We can proceed to the backtesting of the model. 
 
Table 10: Effect of regimes on frequencies 
 (1b) 
Reference model 
(2b) 
Adding HMM regime 
Count model   
  Intercept -10.969*** 
(0.741) 
-11.370*** 
(0.424) 
  Log(Assets) 0.885*** 
(0.053) 
0.916*** 
(0.034) 
  High Regime  -0.531* 
(0.291) 
  GDP 0.018 
(0.034) 
0.011 
(0.039) 
  Bank Cap 4.428*** 
(0.933) 
4.103*** 
(0.705) 
  Mean Salary -0.751 
(0.913) 
-1.642* 
(0.841) 
  Log(theta) 2.097*** 
(0.634) 
1.085*** 
(0.417) 
Zero model   
  Intercept 1.176 
(1.681) 
-4.580* 
(2.712) 
  Log(Assets) -0.176 
(0.120) 
-0.149 
(0.202) 
  High Regime  7.888*** 
(2.502) 
  GDP 0.001 
(0.109) 
2.734*** 
(0.787) 
  Mean Salary 1.466 
(2.569) 
-48.468** 
(23.625) 
AIC 1640.089 1597.558 
Log Likelihood -810.044 -786.779 
Log-Likelihood ratio test   
32 
 
- Statistic 
- p.value 
46.530 
0.000 
Number of observations 4329 4329 
 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
5 Backtesting 
5.1 Operational loss capital 
 
This section has a dual objective. First we want to construct a backtesting procedure for our 
models with regimes to determine their validity. We also want to measure the extent that 
ignoring the existence of regimes in our operational loss data biases calculation of reserve 
capital if this reality is not formally considered. The period selected to calculate coverage is 
January 2010 to December 2010. This period will be designated by Couv0. The regime is high for 
the month of January and low for the 11 other months. We number our three models as 
follows: #1 base model; #2 Markov regime; #3 Markov regime + cross-loading with Business 
Lines and Event Types. To extend Dahen and Dionne (2010), we construct our backtesting by 
taking into account regimes detected. There will be an In-Sample backtesting calculation, in the 
sense that the history will include the period Couv: from January 2001 to December 2010 
(called Hist1). Further, by definition, Out-of-Sample backtesting does not include the period 
covered in the history, and will last from January 2001 to December 2009 (designated by Hist2). 
For each model, the data from the periods Hist1, Hist2 and Couv are scaled according to the 
estimated coefficients in Table 9. For a given bank, scaling is based on the mean value of 
log(Assets) of the bank during the period Couv. Once scaled for a given bank, the historical 
losses (Hist1 or Hist2) can be considered to follow a lognormal distribution. If we consider the 
bank U.S. Bancorp (Table 11), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives a statistic of D = 0.1328 and p-
value = 0.1979. Because the lognormal law is the null hypothesis, the test does not allow us to 
reject it. Given the linearity in log(Assets) of the three models, we can conclude that the 
lognormal is valid for all banks in our BHC sample. We estimate the frequency according to 
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Table 10. We performed 200,000 observations from the lognormal in question, for which we 
calculate the convolution for 2,000 numbers drawn from the negative binomial of the 
corresponding frequency model. This gives us a distribution for which we calculate the reserve 
capital for four degrees of confidence: 95%, 99%, 99.5% and 99.9%. The 99.5% degree of 
confidence lets us evaluate the thickness of the distribution tail, and gives us an idea of what is 
happening in the case where the VaR at 99.9% is not exceeded.  
 
Regarding statistical tests for the VaR, we performed the Kupiec (1995) test, which evaluates 
the number of values in excess of VaR, followed by the DQ test by Engle and Monganelli (2004) 
to measure the independence of number of such values; and lastly the Christoffersen (1998) 
test, which helps us determine the conditional simultaneous coverage of frequency and 
independence of the values in excess of VaR. This gives us a complete and robust view of the 
validity of our backtesting. To provide figures, we have 445 losses recorded for the period Hist1 
and 63 for the period Cov, which gives us 508 = 445 + 63 losses for Hist2. We must calculate the 
probable losses that a given bank incurs during the period Couv. To do so, the 63 losses of Couv 
are scaled to the size of the bank, and each loss is multiplied 56 times by the scaling of the 
models to simulate all 8 BusinessLines and 7 possible EventTypes according to the Basel 
nomenclature (see Table 3). This lets us manage operational risk in all possible cases. The 63 
losses therefore generate 3,528 possible losses, on which we perform statistical backtesting. 
Note that the scaling will cover all historical losses of Hist1 (in-sample) or Hist2 (out-of-sample) 
and all possible losses during the period Couv. Consequently, the model that passes backtesting 
is automatically that which successfully allows simultaneous scaling of all the loss observations 
in question. 
 
We perform the calculations for two banks. The first is U.S. Bancorp (as in Dahen and Dionne, 
2010). Table 11 indicates that the Kupiec test rejects the VaR at 95% in in-sample for base 
model #1 (no regime). The reason for this is that the excess values observed are too few, at 
3.4% versus 5% theoretical. For the rest of the degrees of confidence of model #1 for in-sample 
and out-of-sample, all seems to function properly. The same pattern is seen regarding 
34 
 
independence of the values in excess of VaR except for the VaR at 99.5% in out-of-sample, 
where the DQ test rejects the validity at 5%, whereas the Christoffersen test still does not allow 
us to reject it at 5%. Capital at 99.9% is $2,957.4 million. The bank’s total assets are $290.6 
billion, and reserve capital represents 1.02% of assets. Model #2 shows a weakness in the 
frequency of values in excess of VaR at 95% and 99.5% in in-sample, and VaR at 95% in out-of-
sample. We observe the same weaknesses in model #3 concerning VaR at 95%, 99.5% in in-
sample, and 99% in out-of-sample. For the independence of draws, the DQ test is rejected at 
5% for VaR at 99.5% in-sample, and all else is correct at 5%. The Christoffersen test shows the 
same weakness in in-sample for VaR at 5% and at 99.5%, and the rest is correct at 5%. 
Concerning the reserve capital calculated, it is lower than for benchmark model #1, with 
$2,480.5 million and $2,060.7 for VaR at 99.9% in model #2 and model #3 respectively. 
 
We conclude with two important remarks. The first is that all capital calculated is below that 
calculated for model #1, which does not take into account the existence of regimes. This finding 
supports what we said at the beginning of the paper: that there is an endogenous Hidden 
Markov regime in our data and that ignoring it amounts to injecting a positive bias to calculate 
capital when the regime is at a low level. Conversely, a negative bias increases the risk of 
underestimating the reserve capital required when the regime level is high. Using the 
calculation of model #3, this bias for U.S. Bancorp is (2957.4-2060.7)/2957.4, which is 30.3% too 
high. The second comment is that the various weaknesses shown by the tests above seem to 
mainly arise in VaR at 95%, and always concern excess (very high) reserves. We thus consider 
that models #2 and #3 are validated by backtesting. In addition, model #3 stands out from the 
others by allowing considerable savings in capital. 
 
As further proof, we do the same process for a second BHC bank: Fifth Third Bancorp (Table 
12). Its size is $111.5 billion. We obtain largely the same pattern. Model #3 is still the least 
capital expensive. Note this time that models #2 and #3 do not pass the Kupiec test in out-of-
sample at 99.9%. The same comment can be made for the DQ and Christoffersen tests. 
However, VaR at the intermediate level of 99.5% seems to respond well in the same tests. Note 
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that model #1 is also at the limit of rejection at 5% for the same VaR at 99.9% in out-of-sample 
with a p-value of 0.0506. If we consider model #3 valid, the savings in reserve capital at 99.9% 
would be (1722.6-1291.5)/1722.6 = 25%. Further, the cross-loading of regimes with business 
lines and event types seems to capture the fact that these variables do not have the same 
effects during different phases of the regimes. Consideration of Markov regimes thus provides 
an irrefutable improvement. 
 
5.2 Number of states in HMM model 
 
To further backtest own research, we raise two questions. The first would be whether we can 
statistically justify that a combination of two normals, instead of one normal and an ST4, would 
have been insufficient. The second question is to ask whether the regime should have three 
levels rather than two. A three-level regime would be a mixture of two normals plus an ST4 
(Skew-t type 4). To summarize, we want to compare our model N+ST4 to two other models: 2N 
and 2N+ST4. The estimates imply that we would not have a better specification than N+ST4. We 
tested the normality of the pseudo-residuals of the three models as shown in Table 13. First, 
concerning the model 2N with two levels, all three p-values are below 10%. The data clearly 
show that this model is not adequate. Regarding the three-level model 2N+ST4, we have p-
values of 0.0559, 0.0678 and 0.1863 for Kolomogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling and Shapiro-
Wilk respectively. If we reason at 10%, we have two tests that reject normality whereas only 
Anderson-Darling showed a problem for the two-level N+ST4, as seen above. In addition, the 
value of the AIC criterion of the model 2N+ST4 is 325.59 versus 321.93 for our two-level model 
N+ST4, which indicates deterioration in performance. This deterioration is more evident when 
we use the criterion BIC, which becomes 380.66 for the three-level, whereas it was 352.22 for 
the model N+ST4. We therefore reject the three-level model 2N+ST4 at a level of confidence of 
10%. Consequently, we definitively retain the two level specifications with a normal law and 
one Skew t type 4 for our extreme observations. 
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Another comment is necessary. A priori, if the data allow a sufficient number of observations 
and quality, we should have a better goodness of-fit if we increase the degrees of freedom of a 
given model. In our case, according to Figure 3.6, there are 18 observations representing high 
loss regime. The addition of a third level would have divided up these 18 observations into two 
levels. The three resulting levels would be "normal losses,” "large losses" and "very large 
losses.” However, the 18 observations are too few to model two distinct levels. In addition, very 
few periods start from the ST4 level, which makes this level non-significant.  Lastly, in this case 
it is as if we had a first level represented by a normal, followed by a second with a second 
normal. This three-level model is therefore effectively reduced to two-level regime with two 
normals only, because the ST4 level is not representative. Hence the p-values of the three-level 
regime let us reject the three-level model, together with the two-level model built with two 
normal distributions. 
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Table 11: Backtesting of U.S. Bancorp bank 
Backtesting Model α (Frequency) 
VaR 
Kupiec test DQ of E-M Christoffersen 
Reference model Theoretical Observed Stat. p.value Stat. p.value Stat. p.value 
In-Sample 1 0.050 0.034 269.7 11.039 0.0009 10.246 0.0365 11.797 0.0027 
 1 0.010 0.009 842.3 0.233 0.6292 5.129 0.2744 0.233 0.8899 
 1 0.005 0.004 1289.7 0.116 0.7334 0.208 0.9949 0.116 0.9436 
 1 0.001 0.002 2957.4 1.991 0.1583 2.751 0.6063 1.991 0.3696 
Out-of-Sample 1 0.050 0.043 269.7 1.760 0.1846 2.359 0.6701 2.550 0.2795 
 1 0.010 0.012 842.3 0.479 0.4887 1.404 0.8434 0.479 0.7869 
 1 0.005 0.008 1289.7 2.385 0.1225 14.792 0.0052 5.027 0.0810 
 1 0.001 0.002 2957.4 1.991 0.1583 2.751 0.6003 1.991 0.3696 
HMM regimes          
In-Sample 2 0.050 0.036 230.1 8.755 0.0031 9.183 0.0567 8.812 0.0122 
 2 0.010 0.010 712.1 0.000 1.0000 4.229 0.3759 1.775 0.4118 
 2 0.005 0.009 1067.3 5.659 0.0174 8.089 0.0884 5.659 0.0590 
 2 0.001 0.002 2480.5 0.666 0.4145 0.826 0.9349 0.666 0.7169 
Out-of-Sample 2 0.050 0.039 230.1 4.538 0.0332 5.253 0.2623 4.541 0.1033 
 2 0.010 0.012 712.1 0.479 0.4887 3.802 0.4334 0.479 0.7869 
 2 0.005 0.004 1067.3 0.484 0.4867 0.511 0.9724 0.484 0.7851 
 2 0.001 0.002 2480.5 1.991 0.1583 2.751 0.6063 1.991 0.3696 
HMM regimes and interactions          
In-Sample 3 0.050 0.035 209.0 9.483 0.0021 8.768 0.0672 9.520 0.0086 
 3 0.010 0.011 619.3 0.217 0.6416 6.884 0.1421 1.653 0.4376 
 3 0.005 0.010 913.6 6.999 0.0082 10.165 0.0377 6.999 0.0302 
 3 0.001 0.001 2060.7 0.425 0.5146 0.357 0.9859 0.425 0.8086 
Out-of-Sample 3 0.050 0.043 209.0 1.760 0.1846 3.430 0.4886 1.844 0.3977 
 3 0.010 0.016 619.3 5.730 0.0167 9.258 0.0550 5.730 0.0570 
 3 0.005 0.004 913.6 0.116 0.7334 0.208 0.9949 0.116 0.9436 
 3 0.001 0.002 2060.7 0.666 0.4145 0.826 0.9349 0.666 0.7169 
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Table 12: Backtesting of Fifth Third Bancorp bank 
Backtesting Model α (Frequency) 
VaR 
Kupiec test DQ of E-M Christoffersen 
Reference model Theoretical Observed Stat. p.value Stat. p.value Stat. p.value 
In-Sample 1 0.050 0.028 115.0 20.948 0.0000 18.955 0.0008 21.130 0.000 
 1 0.010 0.008 430.7 0.972 0.3241 1.161 0.8844 0.972 0.6150 
 1 0.005 0.007 689.8 0.909 0.3403 1.334 0.8556 0.909 0.6346 
 1 0.001 0.002 1722.6 1.991 0.1583 2.751 0.6063 1.991 0.3696 
Out-of-Sample 1 0.050 0.038 115.0 5.590 0.0181 7.547 0.1097 5.816 0.0546 
 1 0.010 0.007 430.7 1.553 0.2127 1.614 0.8063 1.553 0.4600 
 1 0.005 0.004 689.8 0.484 0.4867 0.511 0.9724 0.484 0.7851 
 1 0.001 0.003 1722.6 3.822 0.0506 5.812 0.2137 3.822 0.1479 
HMM regimes          
In-Sample 2 0.050 0.032 100.4 13.629 0.0002 17.235 0.0017 17.030 0.0002 
 2 0.010 0.008 377.0 0.972 0.3241 1.161 0.8844 0.972 0.6150 
 2 0.005 0.004 592.2 0.484 0.4867 0.511 0.9724 0.484 0.7851 
 2 0.001 0.002 1522.9 0.666 0.4145 0.826 0.9349 0.666 0.7169 
Out-of-Sample 2 0.050 0.042 100.4 2.415 0.1202 4.089 0.3941 2.536 0.2814 
 2 0.010 0.010 377.0 0.000 1.0000 0.564 0.9670 0.000 1.0000 
 2 0.005 0.009 592.2 4.439 0.0351 6.256 0.1808 4.439 0.1087 
 2 0.001 0.005 1522.9 14.599 0.0001 29.515 0.0000 14.599 0.0007 
HMM regimes and interactions          
In-Sample 3 0.050 0.031 94.4 15.532 0.0001 16.867 0.0021 17.537 0.0002 
 3 0.010 0.008 338.1 0.972 0.3241 1.161 0.8844 0.972 0.6150 
 3 0.005 0.004 522.6 0.484 0.4867 0.511 0.9724 0.484 0.7851 
 3 0.001 0.002 1291.5 0.666 0.4145 0.826 0.9349 0.666 0.7169 
Out-of-Sample 3 0.050 0.042 94.4 2.783 0.0953 4.984 0.2889 2.804 0.2461 
 3 0.010 0.013 338.1 1.829 0.1762 3.369 0.4980 1.829 0.4007 
 3 0.005 0.007 522.6 1.570 0.2102 2.205 0.6981 1.570 0.4562 
 3 0.001 0.003 1291.5 6.057 0.0138 10.012 0.0402 6.057 0.0484 
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Table 13: Statistical tests on pseudo-residuals presuming the existence of three-level model 
 (1) 3-level model (2) 2-level model (3) 2-level model 
 2 Normals + 1 ST4 1 Normal + 1 ST4 2 Normals 
1   Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.0819 0.0559 0.0718 0.1540 0.0849 0.0408 
2   Anderson-Darling 0.6950 0.0678 0.6940 0.0682 0.7873 0.0400 
3   Shapiro-Wilk 0.9839 0.1863 0.9831 0.1650 0.9790 0.0678 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we analyze the effect of business cycles in operational loss data on optimal 
capital of banks. We show that considering business cycles can reduce capital for operational 
risk by redistributing it between high regime and low regime states. The variation of capital is 
estimated to be in the range of 25% to 30% in our period of analysis. We also demonstrate that 
court settlements significantly affect the temporal distribution of losses. Several large losses 
were reported after the financial crisis of 2007-2009 owing to these delays. This phenomenon is 
not new; it is also observed for significant losses sustained by insurance companies whose 
settlement payments are often determined by the courts.  
 
Several extensions of our study are possible. The most promising would be to verify the stability 
of the results using different regime detection methods (Maalaoui, Chun et al., 2014). How can 
an approach to detect regimes in real time improve the results, and in particular take the 
asymmetry detected in this article into account?  The value of this approach is that it allows 
separate analysis of level and volatility regimes. 
 
Another possible extension is to use a different approach than that of scaling of operational 
losses to generate a larger number of observations at each bank. Some banks use the Change of 
Measure Approach proposed by Dutta and Babbet (2013). This method combines scenario 
analysis with historical loss data. It would be interesting to examine whether the results of this 
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approach can remain stable by introducing cycles in the data. It would also be worth extending 
the analyses to stress testing of models. 
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